by Lieven Decock, Igor Douven
Abstract:
In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.
Reference:
Similarity After Goodman. (Lieven Decock, Igor Douven), In Review of philosophy and psychology, volume 2, 2011.
Bibtex Entry:
@article{Decock2011,
abstract = {In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as G\"{a}rdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.},
author = {Decock, Lieven and Douven, Igor},
doi = {10.1007/s13164-010-0035-y},
issn = {1878-5158},
journal = {Review of philosophy and psychology},
keywords = {SML-LIB-BIBLIO,lang:ENG},
mendeley-tags = {SML-LIB-BIBLIO,lang:ENG},
month = mar,
number = {1},
pages = {61--75},
pmid = {22558064},
title = {{Similarity After Goodman.}},
url = {http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3339023\&tool=pmcentrez\&rendertype=abstract},
volume = {2},
year = {2011}
}